Restoring Lost Connections: Land Use, Policing, and Urban Vitality by Garnett, Nicole Stelle




Restoring Lost Connections: Land Use, Policing,
and Urban Vitality
Nicole Stelle Garnett
Notre Dame Law School, ngarnett@nd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Land Use Law Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, and the
State and Local Government Law Commons
This Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nicole S. Garnett, Restoring Lost Connections: Land Use, Policing , and Urban Vitality, 36 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 253 (2011).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/559
RESTORING LOST CONNECTIONS: LAND USE,
POLICING, AND URBAN VITALITY
Nicole Stelle Garnett*
INTRODUCTION
Justice William Brennan rightfully reminded all of us that state
constitutional law is too often neglected in our courtrooms and our
classrooms.' State constitutions, to borrow from the late Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, ought not to be "relegated to the status of a poor
relation" in our constitutional legal structure.2 They differ in important
ways from the federal law Constitution-and those differences provide
the space within which our democratic experiment flourishes. And I am
sure if Justice Brennan were here with us today, he would agree that we
also should not neglect the study of the state and local policies that that
experiment generates. As I am constantly reminding my students, the
state and local governments-and the laws that they make and enforce-
have a far greater daily impact on our lives than the federal-law policies
that take center stage in most law school classrooms.
Specifically, I would like to focus my remarks, which I am honored
to have been asked to give, on local governments and the laws and
policies that they make and enforce. As Richard Briffault has observed,
the discourse in the legal academy on local government law generally
proceeds from an assumption of local powerlessness. 3 And, it is the case,
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. This speech was delivered as the
2010 Brennan Lecture at the Oklahoma City University School of Law on April 8, 2010.
I am honored by the invitation to give the 2010 Brennan Lecture and grateful for the
thoughtful feedback I received on my ideas during my visit to OCU. Portions of my
speech, and this essay, were adapted from my book, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE,
POLICING, AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA (2010).
1. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
2. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
3. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 1-The Structure of Local Government
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that as a matter of legal theory, local governments exist by the grace of-
and at the whims of-state governments.4 In reality, however, local
governments exercise considerable autonomy to shape policies that
affect, in profound ways, our daily lives. In particular, states entrust
local governments with three important, indeed essential, powers-law
enforcement, land use regulation, and education. This lecture focuses
primarily on law enforcement and land use regulation, and in particular
on the often overlooked connections between these two important
spheres of local autonomy. In closing, however, I will say a tiny bit
about education policy as well.
My interest in the connections between policing policy and land use
regulation was sparked-as most of my interests and ideas are-by a
student's comment. (Students, in my experience, have all the best ideas.)
About a decade ago, soon after I entered the legal academy, I began
teaching a seminar on urban-development policy. The seminar is
structured around two big ideas that have revolutionized thinking about
urban policy in the past few decades. The first big idea is Jane Jacobs's
assertion that mixed-land-use urban neighborhoods, and the vitality that
they foster, are superior to the single-land-use suburban neighborhoods
mandated by prevailing land use regulations.6 The second big idea is
James Q. Wilson and George Kelling's broken windows hypothesis,
which posited that uncorrected manifestations of urban disorder-even
minor ones like broken windows-set off a spiral of urban decline that
leads inevitably to serious crime in a community.7 Both of these ideas
have come to be increasingly reflected in legal policy reforms-the
former in urban development strategies promoting "hipness" and urban
vitality and in mixed-use zoning laws and the latter in a multiplicity of
policing strategies aimed at suppressing disorder and restoring the
quality of life in our urban neighborhoods. And, at the end of my first
semester teaching this course, one puzzled student asked whether these
two ideas were not in tension with one another. Was it the case, the
student wondered, that land use regulators were coming to demand less
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 (1990).
4. See generally Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1057 (1980).
5. See Briffault, supra note 3, at 3.
6. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
7. See James Q. Wilson & George Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
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order in our cities, and police reformers more?
The question, I must admit, stumped me at the time. It was one of
those deer-in-the-headlights moments that every young professor has.
But, more importantly, the question stuck with me after I blinked and
blurted out a half-coherent answer to the class. It proved to be the spark
that led to my recent book, Ordering the City: Land Use, Policing, and
the Restoration of Urban America,8 from which many of the ideas in this
essay are drawn. And it has taken me about a decade to formulate an
answer to the student's excellent question that, I think, is actually
coherent and explains why the demand for less-ordered land uses in our
cities is not inconsistent with a demand for more-orderly cities. And my
explanation, which I will test out on you here today, turns on the
connections between land use policies, policing policies, and urban
vitality. In my view, a greater understanding on the part of urban
officials of these connections helps explain-and will help sustain-the
apparent comeback of many cities over the past two decades.
To direct my exploration of these important and often overlooked
policy synergies, I would like to borrow a formula developed by Joel
Kotkin in a wonderful little book called The City: A Global History. In
this book, Kotkin argued that all great cities have three core
characteristics: They are sacred, they are safe, and they are busy.9 I
think that Kotkin's formula has it about right-or, at the least, is a useful
starting point for a meditation about city life. And I am sure that Kotkin
will forgive my artistic license if I take these characteristics out of order.
I. SAFETY
I would like to begin with safety, which is the core goal of law
enforcement policy. Few would argue with Kotkin's assertion that cities
fail unless they keep their citizens safe. City life has long depended upon
two kinds of security-the protection from invading outsiders and from
deviant insiders. Until quite recently, urban civilizations' very existence
depended upon the ability to repel invaders. As Kotkin observed, the rise
of city walls marked the beginnings of an urban society. In fact, when
large walled towns first appeared in China three thousand years ago, the
8. NIcOLE STELLE GARNETr, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND THE
RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA (2010).
9. JOEL KOTKIN, THE CITY: A GLOBAL HISTORY, at xix-xxii (2005).
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characters for "wall" and for "city" were identical. Even during the Pax
Romana, when unprecedented security enabled the free movement of
people, goods, and ideas, many cities-especially on the frontier-
depended upon the protection of walls and legionaries. The return of
urban life to Europe in the centuries after the fall of Rome was similarly
marked by the "erecting [of] a defensive perimeter."' 0  Protecting
inhabitants from invading outsiders is, thankfully, no longer a primary
function of cities. There was a time, after 9/11, that some commentators
feared that it would be," but that, thankfully, has not come to pass
(except, of course, on the TV series 24).
Still, local governments must continue to guarantee their residents'
security by adopting and enforcing the rules necessary to protect them
from deviant insiders. As Kotkin observed, many cities in the
developing world are crippled by a lack of internal security. In these
places, many citizens who can afford to do so retreat into guarded,
walled, suburban enclaves or emigrate abroad. Many of those who
cannot live lives of terror-facing crime or the threat of crime on a daily
basis. Not long ago, many people expected American cities to suffer, in
time, a similar fate. Crime rates rose dramatically during the 1960s and
1970s and then remained at unprecedented levels despite increases in
police expenditures. Nationwide, between 1973 and 1991, violent crime
increased by 82%-murder by 5.4%, rape by 73%, robbery by 50% and
aggravated assault by 118%.12 And, as the crime rate rose, so did fear of
crime, especially in urban areas. Along with the high crime rates, other
factors-including the decriminalization of "victimless" public-order
crimes and the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill-contributed to a
crippling fear of crime and urban disorder.13 By the end of the 1980s,
many Americans who could do so chose simply to avoid urban public
10. Id. at 32-33, 66.
11. See Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, Cities and Warfare: The Impact of
Terrorism on Urban Form, 51 J. URB. EcoN. 205 (2002).
12. Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that
Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2004, at 163, 166.
13. See also George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, From Political to Reform to
Community: The Evolving Strategy of Police, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR
REALITY 3, 15 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988) ("Citizens
abandoned parks, public transportation, neighborhood shopping centers, churches, as well
as entire neighborhoods."); Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City




spaces. Around this time, I remember hearing my grandmother tell my
mother not to take her purse to downtown Kansas City, Missouri,
because it would almost certainly be snatched by a deviant thug as soon
as she got out of the car.
Now, my grandmother was not a city girl-she grew up in southeast
Kansas-and her rural roots undoubtedly influenced her opinions of city
life. Still, her expression of concern was not so far out of line with the
prevailing sentiments about city life. As Paul Grogan and Tony Proscio
have observed, "Out-of-control crime was the nearly universal
expectation for the inner city. Any other positive trend there . . . was
sharply hemmed in by the prospect of continued crime and, just as
important, an all-but-unshakable fear of crime."' 4 By the late 1980s, any
informed observer might have reasonably concluded that our cities were
falling apart at their seams and that any reasonable person would have
cause to abandon them.
Fortunately, however, that did not come to pass. Instead, beginning
in the early 1990s, crime declined dramatically everywhere in the United
States-and especially in major cities. Nationwide, between 1991 and
2001, violent crime decreased by 33.6%-homicide by 42.9%, rape by
24.8%, robbery by 45.8%, and aggravated assault by 26.7%.'1 In major
cities, some declines were even more dramatic. In Chicago, for example,
between 1991 and 2002, robbery declined by 58%, rape by 45%, murder
by 30%, aggravated assault by 41%, burglary by 46%, and motor vehicle
theft by 47%. 16 Public perceptions of the crime also improved during
this time period. In Chicago, to give just one example, African
American and white residents reported that crime fell sharply between
1991 and 2002.'1 Importantly, African American perceptions of the
crime problem, which were historically the most pessimistic, began to
converge with the perceptions of white residents.18
Few would dispute that declining crime rates are a good thing for
cities and the people who live in them, especially for people who are
trapped by life circumstance in the poorest, most dangerous urban
14. PAUL S. GROGAN & TONY PROSCIO, COMEBACK CITIES 152 (2000).
15. Levitt, supra note 12, at 166.
16. CHI. CMTY. POLICING EVALUATION CONSORTIUM, COMMUNITY POLICING IN
CHICAGO, YEAR TEN: AN EVALUATION OF CHICAGO'S ALTERNATIVE POLICING STRATEGY,
at iv (2004).
17. Id. at 54-55.
18. Id. at 66-71.
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communities. The difficulty is that everyone seems to dispute why crime
plummeted. Explanations-all plausible, and some more controversial
than others-range from the waning of the crack epidemic to rising
incarceration rates to the legalization of abortion.1 9 Perhaps the most
intense of these debates focuses on whether crime declined because
police departments across the United States, beginning in the mid-1980s,
began to focus on controlling physical and social disorder and
reregulating our urban public spaces. A major impetus for this strategic
shift in policing priorities was the publication, in 1982, of the Broken
Windows essay.20 In Broken Windows, Wilson and Kelling argued that
the deregulation of our urban public spaces-and the decriminalization
of, or disregard for, minor "victimless" crimes like vagrancy and public
drunkenness-helped catalyze a precipitous decline in our urban
neighborhoods. They reasoned that disorder signals that a community is
out of control-that it cannot, or chooses not to, control social deviancy.
In Wilson and Kelling's words, "[O]ne unrepaired broken window is a
signal that no one cares," they wrote, "and so breaking more windows
costs nothing." 2' The logic, in other words, is that a single broken
window has a multiplier effect: "[I]f a window in a building is broken
and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken."2 2
In the same way, according to Wilson and Kelling, social disorder-or
"'untended behavior' also leads to the breakdown of community
controls."23 But Wilson and Kelling did not stop there. They further
argued that disorder causes serious crime. "[D]isorder and crime," they
asserted, "are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental
sequence. ... If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler
from annoying passersby, the thief may reason, it is even less likely to
call the police to identify a potential mugger or to interfere if the
mugging actually takes place." 2 4
Broken Windows was not the only impetus for what has come to be
known as the order-maintenance revolution in policing policy. On the
contrary, just about everyone was becoming frustrated with the law-
enforcement status quo by 1982-but its influence can hardly be
19. See Levitt, supra note 12, at 176-83.
20. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 7, at 29.
21. Id. at 31.
22. Id (emphasis omitted).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 31. 34.
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overstated. Today, one would be hard-pressed to find a police
department in a major U.S. city that does not purport to focus on curbing
disorder, empowering communities to help set policing priorities by
identifying neighborhood problems, and restoring the quality of life in
urban neighborhoods.25 I have not been able to find one. Many major
cities have completely restructured their police departments to focus on
these things-pulling officers out of police cars and putting them on foot
or on bikes, holding hundreds of community policing meetings each
year, refocusing efforts on "minor" "victimless" crimes like prostitution,
aggressive panhandling, and misdemeanor drug possession, and-in an
effort made famous by Rudy Giuliani in New York City-clearing city
streets of hustlers and "squeegeemen."
Broken Windows and the policing reforms that flow from it have
prompted intense academic debates about the wisdom, justice, and
efficacy of order-maintenance strategies. I would like to focus on one of
those debates-the debate about the causal connection between disorder
and crime. (I leave to one side the second, and equally important, debate
about whether order-maintenance policies threaten to undermine civil
liberties.26) The purported causal connection between disorder and crime
has been tested in various ways-some scholars have sought to measure
whether more disorderly neighborhoods are more dangerous;27 others
have sought to measure whether disorder-control efforts curb serious
crime.28 These debates have turned into a bit of a scholarly shouting
25. Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 577 (1997).
26. For an accessible overview of this debate, see generally TRACEY L. MEARES &
DAN M. KAHAN, URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES
(1999).
27. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF
DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 65-84 (1990) (finding a causal connection
between disorder and robbery rates); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE
FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 128-30 (2001) (challenging Skogan's
findings); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation
of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. Soc.
603, 612-29 (1999) (finding disorder was correlated with robbery but questioning a
causal connection between disorder and serious crime).
28. GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, JR., CTR. FOR CIVIC INNOVATION, Do
POLICE MATTER? AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK CITY'S POLICE REFORMS,
Civic REPORT No. 22 (2001) (attributing the dramatic decline in crime in New York City
to an aggressive misdemeanor arrest policy); Hope Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots,
Sticks, and Broken Windows, 48 J.L. & ECON. 235, 262 (2005) (analyzing data from New
York and finding that an aggressive misdemeanor arrest policy led to a decrease in
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match-with some scholars claiming to prove that disorder causes
serious crime, and that disorder-control efforts prevent it, and others
vigorously challenging their findings.
Now, I must admit that while I have read all the studies, I am not an
empiricist. And, since I cannot check the math, it is difficult to know
what to think. It seems likely to me that certain kinds of order-
maintenance policing techniques do "work"-that is, that they do reduce
crime. But these reductions may or may not have something to do with
curbing disorder. For example, when New York City began an
aggressive campaign of arresting turnstile jumpers, it discovered that
many turnstile jumpers had outstanding felony arrest warrants. The
resulting incarceration of felons might have reduced serious crime-
regardless of whether the disorder of turnstile jumping causes serious
crime. The vibe of the studies also suggests to me that, at the very least,
disorder seems to be linked to higher robbery rates. This is the most
consistent finding in the studies. Still, I do not claim to know with any
degree of certainty which side of the empirical debate is correct. Bernard
Harcourt and Jens Ludwig may be right. We are left with a Scottish
verdict-"not proven." 29 Or, as James Q. Wilson himself has observed,
"'God knows what the truth is."' 30
But I want to make the case that these empirical shouting matches
miss the point--or at least some important points-about order-
maintenance policies. We do not, or perhaps even cannot, know with
certainty whether disorder causes crime, but we do know other things
about disorder. And the things that we can know are important-so we
should not lose sight of the forest for the trees fighting about regressions
and robbery rates. And I am sure that it is a point that James Q. Wilson
and George Kelling would wholeheartedly endorse. After all, in Broken
Windows, Wilson and Kelling admitted-on the first page of their
essay-that order-maintenance policing will not necessarily reduce
crime. The essay was prompted by the Newark Foot Patrol Experiment,
which increased the presence of police officers walking the beats instead
of driving patrol cars. Kelling participated in an evaluation of the
incidents of violent crime); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New
Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 271,
275-77 (2006) (challenging these New York City studies).
29. Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 28, at 276.
30. Patricia Cohen, Oops, Sorry: Seems that My Pie Chart Is Half-Baked, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 8, 2000, at B7.
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program, which found, in Wilson and Kelling's words, that "to the
surprise of hardly anyone . . . foot patrol[s] had not reduced crime
rates."3 1 Despite this, however, they still concluded that the foot patrols
had made the affected neighborhoods safer. They reasoned that
"residents of the foot-patrolled neighborhoods seemed to feel more
secure[,] ... tended to believe that crime had been reduced, and seemed
to take fewer steps to protect themselves from crime (staying at home
with the doors locked, for example)."32
This is a critically important insight. Because even if disorder does
not cause serious crime, it causes us to think that we are in danger of
being victimized (even when we are not). In other words, disorder
scares us. While the causal connection between disorder and crime is
hotly contested, the connection between disorder and the fear of crime is
not. Fear of crime is frequently overlooked in debates about order-
maintenance policies, and it should not be. Nearly all efforts to measure
the connection between disorder and fear find a strong positive
correlation. People intuitively associate disorder and crime. Apparently,
the average observer agrees with the broken windows hypothesis; when
she sees physical disorder or experiences social incivilities in a
neighborhood, she assumes that more serious crimes are prevalent there
as well. Studies consistently show that residents living in neighborhoods
with high levels of disorder are more fearful than those living in more
orderly neighborhoods. And, interestingly, residents in the same
neighborhood experience different levels of fear depending upon their
individual perceptions of the amount of disorder in their communities.3 3
Fear of crime is not the same thing as crime to be sure. Crime
statistics suggest that we are more afraid than we need to be-that is,
crime rates are lower than we think that they are. But that does not mean
that fear is irrelevant to debates about policing policies. Fear imposes
tremendous costs on our society for a number of related reasons. First,
31. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 7, at 29.
32. Id.
33. See Jeanette Covington & Ralph B. Taylor, Fear of Crime in Urban Residential
Neighborhoods: Implications of Between- and Within-Neighborhood Sources for
Current Models, 32 Soc. Q. 231 (1991); Randy L. LaGrange et al., Perceived Risk and
Fear of Crime: Role of Social and Physical Incivilities, 29 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 311 (1992); Edmund F. McGarrell et al., Neighborhood Disorder,
Integration, and the Fear of Crime, 14 JUST. Q. 479 (1997); Chris L. Gibson et al., Social
Integration, Individual Perceptions of Collective Efficacy, and the Fear of Crime in
Three Cities, 19 JUST. Q. 537 (2002).
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when we are afraid, we take steps to protect ourselves. These
precautions are costly. Each year, Americans spend more on private-
crime-avoidance precautions-estimates range from $160 billion to $300
billion-than on the total U.S. law enforcement budget-that is, more
than U.S. governments at all levels (federal, state, and local) spend on
police, prosecutors, judges, and prisons.34 And these figures do not
reflect the total cost of crime avoidance, such as the opportunity costs of
remaining inside behind locked doors to avoid victimization.
Second, steps taken to avoid crime may have the perverse effect of
increasing it. In numerous studies, social scientists have demonstrated a
social influence effect on the compliance with legal rules. That is,
social scientists have shown that people are more likely to obey the law
when they perceive that their neighbors are obeying the law. But private
actions taken to avoid victimization cannot, by definition, support such a
perception. Logically, would-be victims should not take steps to protect
themselves from victimization if their neighbors are law-abiding; they
will take precautions only if they believe themselves to be surrounded by
criminals. Indeed, the private deterrence measures that fearful
individuals are most likely to take-including neighborhood watch
groups, alarm systems, extra locks, and bars on the windows-tend to
signal that crime is prevalent in a community.
Even if neighbors do not interpret precautionary measures as
evincing a lack of trust-perhaps because the community is plagued by
criminals from other neighborhoods-fear, and the precautionary
measures fear generates, may still increase crime by reducing
neighborhood social capital. By social capital, I refer to, in Robert
Putnam's words, "social networks and the norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness that arise from them." 37 Fear undoubtedly impedes a
community's ability to generate and capitalize upon social capital.
Consider, for example, the likely effects of one of the simplest and most
common crime-avoidance strategies-remaining indoors. As Jane
Jacobs influentially argued, the presence of law-abiding residents in a
34. Robert A. Mikos, "Eggshell" Victims, Private Precautions, and the Societal
Benefits of Shifting Crime, 105 MICH. L. REV. 307, 308 (2006).
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83
VA. L. REv. 349 (1997).
37. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000).
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community's public spaces provides eyes upon the street that keep crime
and disorder in check.3 ' But, when law-abiding, but fearful, residents
become prisoners in their own homes, their fear effectively forces them
to turn over public spaces in a community to their would-be victimizers.
The "prisoner-in-my-own-home" phenomenon also reduces informal
inter-neighbor socialization and the social capital that it generates. In
urban neighborhoods, an important predictor of both actual crime and
fear of crime is what sociologists and social psychologists call
"collective efficacy," or the "ability of neighborhoods to realize the
common values of residents and maintain effective social controls." 3 9
Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated both that neighborhoods
with low levels of collective efficacy are more dangerous than those with
higher levels and that residents of such neighborhoods also are more
fearful. 40 Not surprisingly, a resident who counts on her neighbors to
address community problems has less cause to fear victimization. In
other words-when we are afraid, we do not go outside and get to know
our neighbors, so it becomes impossible for a neighborhood to organize
to take care of neighborhood problems. And, if common sense (and
social science) can predict anything with certainty-it is that a
neighborhood that can organize, informally, to take care of neighborhood
problems is healthier (and safer) than a neighborhood that cannot.
Third, disorder-triggered fear causes those of us with financial means
to move to safer, less-disorderly neighborhoods. When we become
afraid, those of us who can afford to move, move. In one nationwide
study, for example, Julie Cullen and Steven Levitt found a strong
correlation between crime and urban flight: Each reported city crime
correlated with a one-person decline in city population; a 10% increase
in crime corresponded to a 1% decline in city population.41 Moreover,
this study focused on the connection between actual crime and out-
migration, that is, moves from the city to suburbs. It is reasonable to
assume that the fear of crime exerts at least as robust an influence on
residents' decisions about whether to move from one city neighborhood
to another. As a result, safer neighborhoods enjoy greater residential
38. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 45-54.
39. Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study
of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 918 (1997).
40. See, e.g., Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 27; Gibson et al., supra note 33.
41. Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, Crime, Urban Flight, and the
Consequences for Cities, 81 REv. ECON. & STAT. 159, 159 (1999).
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stability-that is, they have relatively low levels of resident turnover and
high levels of homeownership-than more dangerous ones. And, again,
it comes as no surprise both that residential stability and homeownership
are important predictors of neighborhood health and that highly
educated, wealthier households with children also are most responsive to
crime-that is, most likely to relocate when they become fearful. For all
of these reasons, sociologists Robert Sampson and Stephen
Raudenbush's prediction that disorder may lead to serious crime not
directly but rather because it may "operate[] in a cascading fashion-
encouraging people to move (increasing residential instability) or
discouraging efforts at building collective responses"-seems self-
42evidently correct to me.
I have one final point about disorder, which is somewhat distinct
from my observations about its connection to the fear of crime. It is also
worth noting that the fear of crime impacts different demographic groups
differently. And, for a host of reasons, we can know for certain that
disorder diminishes the quality of life in urban neighborhoods-
regardless of whether it causes crime-and those who suffer the most
from the negative effects of disorder are those who have the least
wherewithal to avoid it. I am a Catholic. And an important principle of
Catholic Social Thought is something called the preferential option for
the poor. The idea is a simple one-and certainly not an exclusively
Catholic one-our legal policies ought to consider first the needs of the
least among us.
We all know that the least among us live to the greatest extent with
unchecked disorder. Consider an unpleasant example: Have you ever
been at a park with a young child who spies a condom on the ground? I
have. Have you ever been chased, while playing at a park with your
children, by a mentally ill person? I have. And I never went back to
either park. Thankfully, however, I have choices about where to take my
children. And so, I have never seen a broken crack vile or a dirty syringe
or a prostitute while I was at a park with my children, but I know that
hundreds of thousands of parents have. And they are the parents with
fewer recreational and residential choices than me. Their choice: Avoid
the park or face the disorder. And if cleaning up the parks makes their
lives better, their children's lives better, then I think we have a moral
obligation to clean up the park. To paraphrase Justice Clarence
42. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 27, at 637.
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Thomas's dissent in the City of Chicago v. Morales case, the people who
have to live with the consequences of disorder do not live in our
neighborhoods.43 But we are obligated to improve theirs, even if the
improvements do not directly reduce crime.
So what is the bottom line about safety, disorder, and policing
policy? Disorder may or may not cause crime, but we know at least two
important things about disorder with certainty. First, disorder scares
us-destabilizing urban neighborhoods and making it more difficult for
cities to compete with suburbs for residents who have choices about
where to live. Second, it makes life difficult for the least among us-and
addressing disorder will make it less difficult, a fact that we ought not to
lose sight of arguing about regressions and robbery rates.
II. BUSYNESS
Perceptions of security are related in important ways to a second part
of Kotkin's formula. Great cities, Kotkin argued, are busy-they are
vital. Obviously, busyness and safety are closely connected: A city
neighborhood is unlikely to be busy if it is not safe-if crime and the fear
of crime prompts us to move to the suburbs or makes us too scared to go
outside. That said, busyness, or urban vitality, is primarily the province
not of law enforcement, but of land use regulators. Land use regulation,
in a sense, set the pace of the social and economic life of our cities. And
our prevailing land use regulations do not favor busyness. Our dominant
form of land use regulation, zoning, reflects a long-standing judgment
that the appropriate way to order different land uses is to separate them
from one another into single-use zones. Zoning has from its inception
been predicated on the belief that ordered land uses suppress disorder.
City officials have long assumed either that economic activity is disorder
or that it fosters disorder, and they have therefore sought to shield
residences from disorder by segregating them away from "incompatible"
(that is, commercial) land uses.
For this reason, many of our cities are not busy places. For example,
I am from the suburbs of Kansas City, and I grew up thinking that
downtowns and cities were places that people worked, not lived.
Downtown Kansas City was eerily deserted come 6 p.m., when "regular
43. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 114-15 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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people" went home where they belonged-to tidy, all-residential
suburbs. (I must admit that it did not occur to me until much later that
many of the neighborhoods where people lived were neither tidy nor all-
residential-that was simply beyond my suburban experience.)
Downtown Kansas City has changed somewhat. There are more busy
center-city neighborhoods in Kansas City, Missouri, today than there
were when I graduated from high school in the late 1980s. And the
uptick in busyness likely is, at least in part, attributable to the fact that
people feel safer in center-city neighborhoods than today. But the new
busyness also is attributable to the growing influence of Jane Jacobs's
contrarian view of land use regulation, which has been popularized in
recent years by the self-styled "new urbanists." Jacobs argued that
zoning had it exactly backwards-that, in contrast to the prevailing
wisdom about land use planning-busy, mixed-use urban neighborhoods
were superior to sterile, single-use ones. And she offered an order-
maintenance justification for saying so. As Jacobs acknowledged, "The
bedrock attribute of a successful city district is that a person must feel
personally safe and secure on the street among . . . strangers."4 4
Commercial land uses, she reasoned, helped promote this necessary
security: Commercial land uses, and the urban vitality that they promote,
give people a reason to be present on city streets and sidewalks
throughout the night and day. And, when more people are present, she
reasoned, there are more eyes upon the street to keep disorder in check
and monitor and curb potential criminal behavior.45
Jacobs offered a second reason for favoring mixed-use
neighborhoods-a reason that is also related to the broken windows
hypothesis: Commercial land uses-the neighborhood pub and the
corner store-promote social capital by bringing together strangers who
would not otherwise interact. Now Jacobs did not use the words social
capital, but that is surely what she meant. And, in particular, she was
referring to the formation of what Robert Putnam has called "bridging"
social capital-"bridging" referring to the bridging of strangers, in
contrast to the "bonding" of friends. 4 6 The social-capital-production
function of commercial land uses, Jacobs argued, is critical in diverse
urban neighborhoods because there is only so much that the police can
44. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 30.
45. See id at 38, 44-51.
46. PUTNAM, supra note 37, at 22-24.
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do: "The first thing to understand," she argued, "is that the public
peace-the sidewalk and street peace-of cities is not kept primarily by
the police, necessary as police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate,
almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among
the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves."47
(Interestingly, James Q. Wilson, father of the broken windows
hypothesis himself, said basically the same thing a few years later! But
why he changed his tune is a question for another time. 4 8) Jacobs's
argument, in my view, has tremendous intuitive appeal. It seems self-
evident to me that busy city neighborhoods feel safer than deserted ones.
To test my intuition, ask yourself the following question: If you were to
be left alone in a poor urban neighborhood, would you pick a deserted
residential street or a busy commercial one? The difficulty is that the
empirical evidence testing Jacobs's assertion that busy, mixed-use urban
neighborhoods are safer than single-use residential neighborhoods does
not necessarily bear out this intuition. Jacobs famously argued that even
a neighborhood bar might reduce crime by increasing the presence of
people late into the night.4 9 Now, I am a big fan of neighborhood pubs,
but I have to tell you that the available data strongly suggests that bars
are generators, not preventers, of crime. In fact, most social scientists
have concluded that commercial land uses generally (and not just
criminal hotspots like bars) are associated with elevated levels of crime
and disorder. One study of 100 Seattle neighborhoods found that the
introduction of a single commercial enterprise corresponded with a 31%
increase in serious crime.50 Researchers conducting these studies link
their findings to the "routine activities" theory of crime-which is a
fancy way of saying that most crime is opportunistic-that it involves
"motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable
guardians." 1 Commercial land uses, according to this view, bring
together victims and offenders and, contra Jacobs, may in fact reduce
opportunities for private surveillance by making it more difficult for
47. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 31-32.
48. See James Q. Wilson, The Urban Unease: Community vs. City, PUB. INT.,
Summer 1968, at 25.
49. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 52-53.
50. Pamela Wilcox et al., Busy Places and Broken Windows? Toward Defining the
Role of Physical Structure and Process in Community Crime Models, 45 Soc. Q. 185,
185, 198 (2004).
51. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 27, at 610 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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residents to determine who "belongs" in a neighborhood. 52
I must admit that when I read these studies, I was crushed. I had
always strongly endorsed Jacobs's arguments-and now I was faced
with evidence that they were intuitively appealing but empirically
unsustainable. Perhaps, I wondered, my student was right? Urban
leaders are coming to demand more disorder, and less, in our cities?
Perhaps zoning has it right, and busyness is bad? Upon reflection, I have
come-again-to believe that these studies may only tell part of the
story. That is not to say that proponents of the legal reforms necessary to
enable mixed-land-use urban neighborhoods to exist and flourish do not
need to come to terms with these studies. We must. But, that said, these
studies-at least in my view-raise as many questions as they answer.
First, while the literature linking commercial land uses to crime and
disorder could be interpreted to suggest that economic activity should be
minimized in the poorest urban neighborhoods, in most poor
neighborhoods, the problem is not too much commerce but too little.
Ask yourself whether, in a community where the prevailing land use is
vacant and abandoned buildings, residents would prefer the status quo to
more commerce? The answer seems clear. Not only could economic
activity help address the crisis of unemployment and concentrated
poverty facing many poor neighborhoods-both of which have their own
troubling social-influence effects-but filling vacant store fronts would
directly diminish crime and disorder by leaving fewer places for
criminals to hang out.5 3 In fact, one study found that nonresidential land
uses were detrimental in relatively stable neighborhoods but beneficial in
unstable ones. In other words, nonresidential land uses appeared to
increase crime and disorder in relatively stable middle-class communities
54
and to decrease crime and disorder in relatively poor ones.
Second, I am going to go out on a limb and suggest that the link
between busyness and increased crime is not always a bad thing. To
understand why, consider this: What if busy streets make people feel
52. The empirical literature testing the link between land use patterns, crime, and
disorder is summarized in GARNErr, supra note 8, ch. 4, at 77-100.
53. See Stephen Clowney, Invisible Businessman: Undermining Black Enterprise
with Land Use Rules, 2009 ILL. L. REv. 1061; see also John Accordino & Gary T.
Johnson, Addressing the Vacant and Abandoned Property Problem, 22 J. URB. AFF. 301,
303 (2000) ("Crooks, killers, and losers tend to infest areas with dead buildings, like
maggots on a carcass.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Wilcox et al., supra note 50, at 200.
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safer even if they are not? What if the presence of eyes upon the street
entices residents to come out from behind their locked doors and mingle
in public spaces? It is possible that crime will increase-at least
temporarily-because the number of potential victims present in public
spaces will increase. But, to return to my previous discussion, the law
ought to care about more than crime levels. If it did not, we would favor
round-the-clock curfews. Consider a tort-law analogy. As Guido
Calabresi helpfully elucidated in The Costs ofAccidents, the total cost of
accidents includes both the costs resulting from accidents and the costs
of measures taking to deter or prevent them: "I take it as axiomatic,"
Calabresi argued, "that the principal function of accident law is to reduce
the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents." 5
Similarly, the law arguably should seek not simply to minimize crime,
but to minimize the costs of crime, the fear of crime, and crime-
avoidance costs. If busyness reduces the fear of crime and crime-
avoidance costs, then the cost of mixed-use neighborhoods might well be
lower than the cost of single-use ones-even if crime rates stay the same
or even increase. And, over time, incentivizing people to leave their
homes may well affect a transfer of "title," so to speak, of our public
spaces to law abiding citizens.
Third, busyness can help cities compete with suburbs for residents
and businesses. There is a principle of international trade economics
known as comparative advantage. And the principle of comparative
advantage suggests that international trading partners ought to focus on
doing the things that they are least bad at doing. Now, it is fairly
obvious that even when cities are bad at being cities-and there are, we
must acknowledge, bad cities-they are probably better at being cities
than being suburbs.5 6 There is some empirical support for my hunch
here. During the last few decades, many center cities gained population
after years of decline. And, while the reasons for the "urban rebound"
are contested and somewhat opaque, the best explanatory summary of
the trends favoring urban development (at least in my opinion) comes
from economists Edward Glaeser and Joshua Gottlieb. Glaeser and
55. GuIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970).
56. This is true even if suburbs come to offer mixed-use urban environments that are,
in some senses, superior to older urban neighborhoods. (For example, a "new urbanist"
planned unit development in a suburb might well offer better public schools and newer
low-maintenance buildings than a traditional urban community.) See Nicole Stelle
Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1, 45-46 (2004).
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Gottlieb attribute the urban rebound to two phenomena-first, declining
crime rates and a renewed emphasis by urban police forces on the quality
of life in urban communities and second, an increasing demand among
elites for the social, economic amenities fostered by dense, mixed-use
urban neighborhoods. Glaeser and Gottlieb point out that you cannot
have one without the other-elite tastes for city life were fueled by the
fact that an increased focus on city safety enabled more people to take
advantage of city life.
Now, the current economic downturn has cast a cloud of doubt on
the future of our cities; city redevelopment efforts have screeched to a
halt, and many city neighborhoods-especially poor minority
neighborhoods-have been devastated by foreclosures. But I was
heartened when, a few weeks ago as I was preparing to teach my urban-
development seminar, I came across a surprising article in the Wall Street
Journal. I was looking for articles suggesting that the Great Recession
has cast a cloud of doubt on urban development prospects. But the first
article that I found suggested the opposite: Cities Grow at Suburbs
Expense During Recession.59 And the reasons why were in keeping with
land use strategies that promote city busyness: Increasingly, people with
means are choosing to live in cities because they like living in cities-
that is, they (as Glaeser and Gottlieb suggest) like the vitality that dense,
mixed-use urban environments foster.60
III. SACREDNESS
Now I have covered safety (and policing policy) and vitality (and
land use policy). But I would like to close with Kotkin's third criterion.
Cities, he said, must be safe, and they must be busy, but they also must
be sacred. But what does it mean to say that a city is sacred? The
question was an easy enough one to answer in ancient times when cities
were the centers of religious (as well as cultural and economic) life. But
cities-at least in the Western world-no longer serve a religious
function. So what can be said about the "sacredness" of cities in a
57. Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the Consumer
City, 43 URB. STUD. 1275, 1276, 1288 (2006).
58. Id. at 1288.
59. Conor Dougherty, Cities Grow at Suburbs Expense During Recession, WALL ST.





The "new urbanists," who promote the implementation of Jane
Jacobs's ideas about the superiority of mixed-land-use neighborhoods in
planning policy, argue that "sacredness" is captured in good (that is,
traditional) urban design and the social capital that it fosters. For
example, my colleague Phil Bess from Notre Dame's School of
Architecture has argued that mixed-use neighborhoods are required by
the natural law, and he even entitled his book on new urbanism, Till We
Have Built Jerusalem: Architecture, Urbanism, and the Sacred.6 ' New
urbanists like Bess argue that cities can effectively mandate "sacredness"
by substituting urban design guidelines for zoning rules and promoting
the mixing of land uses and a traditional urban aesthetic. I must admit
that I am drawn to the new-urbanist aesthetic and their argument that
traditional neighborhoods foster social capital by, qua Jacobs, drawing
together diverse strangers. That said, I worry more than a little bit about
the costs associated with implementing their regulatory model. And,
while Jane Jacobs's arguments about the social-capital-production
function of mixed-land-use neighborhoods are appealing, the available
evidence suggests that social capital runs deeper in the suburbs than in
citieS6 2-perhaps because the bonds of like individuals are deeper than
the bridges between diverse strangers or perhaps because urban residents
do not stick around long enough to bond with their neighbors. In fact,
there is evidence-depressing in my view-that diversity reduces, rather
than fosters, social capital.63
And, perhaps most importantly, while I am not a scholar of the
natural law, I also think that sacredness has to be about more than the
way our cities look. It must be deeper-not about how our cities look,
but about what they are. Cities, to be sacred, must be real. They must
be the kinds of places that real people live real lives and raise real
families. They must be more than playgrounds for wealthy elites-
consumer and cultural Disneylands. So I worry that H.G. Wells's
prediction of a century ago may be coming to pass: "cities may now be
morphing ... from commanding centers of economic life toward a more
61. PHILIP BESS, TILL WE HAVE BUILT JERUSALEM: ARCHITECTURE, URBANISM, AND
THE SACRED (2006).
62. See Glaeser & Gottlieb, supra note 57, at 1293-97.
63. See Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the
Twenty-first Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137 (2007).
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ephemeral role as a 'bazaar, a great gallery of shops and places of
concourse and rendezvous."'64 Some cities today are prone to taking
short cuts by engaging what Kotkin has called the "cool city
strategy"65-that is, trying to succeed by simply being hip, using mixed-
land-use neighborhoods and new urbanist aesthetics (augmented by
order-maintenance policies) to attract young, unattached yuppies.
(Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm has even launched a "Cool
Cities" initiative. 66)
The cool city strategy draws intellectual heft from Richard Florida's
influential 2002 book, The Rise of the Creative Class.67 Florida argued
that in order to thrive, modem cities must attract "the creative class"-
the young and well educated, artists, high-tech professionals, gays and
lesbians. Cities, according to Florida, "have become the prime location
for the creative lifestyle and the new amenities that go with it."68 And,
importantly, cities are benefiting from the energy provided by creative
young professionals, who stay single longer than in previous generations
and prefer to live in diverse, urban neighborhoods. The cool cities
strategy has a number of limitations, not least of which is the unfortunate
reality that even the cool kids grow up and, when they do, many of them
move to the suburbs. The fact remains that most young professionals,
even hip ones, do not remain unattached and childless forever. When
their life circumstances change, they face the same pressures and
demands that all parents face-the need for more space, a yard, and good
public schools. And these pressures inevitably lead many of them to
move to the suburbs. Creativity may be a key to modern economic
success, but as Kotkin quipped, "[i]t turns out that many of the most
prized members of the 'creative class' are not 25-year-old hip cools, but
fortysomething adults who, particularly if they have children, end up
gravitating to the suburbs and more economically dynamic cities like
Phoenix, Boise, Charlotte or Orlando."69
64. KOTKIN, supra note 9, at 151 (quoting H.G. WELLS, ANTICIPATIONS OF THE
REACTION OF MECHANICAL AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS UPON HUMAN LIFE AND THOUGHT
32 (1902)).
65. Joel Kotkin, Uncool Cities, PROSPECT (Oct. 22, 2005), http://
www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2005/1 0/uncoolcities/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. To learn more about the "Cool Cities" initiative, visit COOLCITIES, http://
www.coolcities.com/main.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2010).
67. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS (2002).
68. Id. at 287.
69. Kotkin, supra note 65.
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I have doubts about whether this revolving cool kids' door is,
ultimately, sufficient to sustain urban life in the long run. Remember, for
example, that social science research consistently links neighborhood
social capital and collective efficacy with residential tenure and
homeownership. This connection is, of course, easily explained. Not
only do homeowners have economic incentives to organize to address
neighborhood problems, but social integration into a neighborhood
naturally increases over time, providing opportunities to build trust
relationships. And, of course, all parents know that sharing the joys and
burdens of childrearing with friends and neighbors also builds and
sustains lasting relationships. Both of these realities suggest that the
most successful, safest city neighborhoods ultimately will be the kinds of
places where people choose to make their lives long term-to live, work,
and raise families. In the end, I think that Kotkin is right. Cities must be
safe and busy, but they also must be real-sacred-places. If so,
restoring the connections between land use and policing-between safety
and vitality-are necessary, but not sufficient, steps toward restoring
long-term urban health.
CONCLUSION
And so, I end with a plea to urban officials eager to promote urban
vitality: Recognize the connections between two of your three most
important functions-land use and policing. But remember also that is
not enough to draw cool and creative young people to your
neighborhoods. It also is necessary to keep them there when reality
hits-and, for most parents, reality hits when they consider (and reject)
the urban educational options available for their children. Unfortunately,
my time does not permit me to set forth a grand plan for improving the
educational options available to urban residents-although I strongly
endorse policies, including school choice and charter schools, that
promise to increase educational diversity in our cities. As I tell my
students in local government law, local governments are entrusted with
three critical legal policy functions-policing, land use regulation, and
education. And, in the end, all three are needed to ensure a sacred, safe,
and busy future for our cities.
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